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Abstract
In times of the COVID-19 pandemic, difficult decisions such as the distribution of ventila-
tors must be made. For many of these decisions, humans could team up with algorithms; 
however, people often prefer human decision-makers. We examined the role of situational 
(morality of the scenario; perspective) and individual factors (need for leadership; con-
ventionalism) for algorithm preference in a preregistered online experiment with German 
adults (n = 1,127). As expected, algorithm preference was lowest in the most moral-laden 
scenario. The effect of perspective (i.e., decision-makers vs. decision targets) was only sig-
nificant in the most moral scenario. Need for leadership predicted a stronger algorithm 
preference, whereas conventionalism was related to weaker algorithm preference. Explor-
atory analyses revealed that attitudes and knowledge also mattered, stressing the impor-
tance of individual factors.
Keywords: algorithm preference, decision-making, perspective, need for leadership, 
conventionalism
In December 2019, a virus causing the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) first appeared 
in Wuhan, China. It rapidly spread around the world, and the outbreak was declared a pan-
demic by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020 (WHO, 2020). By April 2021, 
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During the pandemic, many decisions with far-reaching consequences had to be made: 
Governments had to decide on which restrictions to impose on the population (e.g., closing 
schools, imposing curfews) and when to loosen them (Gollwitzer et al., 2020); physicians 
had to decide who gets a potentially life-saving ventilator in overwhelmed hospitals, and 
civil servants at ministries had to decide which businesses receive financial support after 
being forced to close for months. 
Algorithms could have helped in making these and related decisions. Algorithms pro-
cess “(big) data captured through digitized devices” and use past behavior to predict future 
events (Newell & Marabelli, 2015, p. 4). Algorithms might be especially helpful in situations 
like the pandemic in which human deciders lack experience. However, prior research has 
shown that people are often algorithm averse (Castelo et al., 2019; Dietvorst et al., 2015). 
For policymakers, it is thus important to know under which circumstances algorithmic 
decision-making and, more specifically, different combinations of human-algorithm team-
ing would be accepted. Two groups are important in this context: (1) the decision-makers 
who could now (also) rely on algorithmic input and (2) the decision targets whose out-
comes depend on the decisions made. The question of human-machine teaming has been 
addressed in the field of human-machine communication, but usually from the perspective 
of the decision-maker and with a focus on more agentic and anthropomorphic virtual team-
mates such as robots (Calhoun et al., 2019; Matthews et al., 2020). Work on algorithm accep-
tance has addressed both perspectives, albeit usually not in the same study; we thus build on 
work on algorithm acceptance to identify relevant situational and individual influence fac-
tors and develop a new measure that goes beyond a dichotomous human versus algorithm 
choice, which enables assessment of the preference for different human-algorithm teaming 
combinations. This approach promotes ecological validity because algorithms rarely make 
decisions on their own but usually function as advisors or recommenders.
Specifically, we examined morality of the decision scenario and the perspective as situa-
tional factors and both conventionalism and need for leadership as individual factors. Previ-
ous work has found that people are more averse to algorithms when moral decisions must be 
made (Bigman & Gray, 2018; Castelo et al., 2019). We aim to extend this work by examining 
whether it matters from which perspective the algorithmic decision-making is judged: Do 
people show a higher preference for algorithms if they take the decision-maker’s perspective 
compared to the perspective of the target of the decision? A physician, for example, might 
perceive the algorithm as an “advanced tool” (Matthews et al., 2020, p. 234), whereas patients 
might perceive it as a threat and prefer a human deciding upon their life. 
Most prior work on algorithm aversion looked at characteristics of the algorithm or the 
human counterpart, but less on characteristics of the individuals choosing between algorith-
mic and human decision-making (Jussupow et al., 2020). In this paper, we look at conven-
tionalism—an individual characteristic that should favor human decision-making—and an 
individual’s need for leadership. Need for leadership might be especially relevant in times 
of COVID-19 because this need is stronger in times of crisis (Mulder & Stemerding, 1963). 
Algorithm Aversion and Appreciation 
The term algorithm aversion has been coined by Dietvorst et al. (2015) to describe the 
sometimes not rational reaction of users toward algorithms, such as a preference for human 
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decision-making even if the algorithmic decisions are superior to the ones made by humans. 
Research on algorithm aversion has yielded inconsistent results, documenting also cases in 
which individuals prefer algorithms to humans (algorithm appreciation, e.g., Dietvorst et 
al., 2016; Logg et al., 2019).
Jussupow et al. (2020) reviewed experimental work in this field to identify charac-
teristics of the algorithm versus a human decision-maker that predict whether algorithm 
aversion or appreciation occurs. Frequently studied characteristics of the algorithms 
are their agency or performance, and frequently studied characteristics of the human 
decision-maker are their involvement in the development or training of the algorithm or 
their expertise. Algorithmic agency led to aversion; thereby people were especially averse 
to algorithms making decisions independently (Jussupow et al., 2020). Moreover, algorithm 
aversion was lower when people perceived the algorithms as performing well and possess-
ing human capabilities, whereas higher expertise of the human agent increased algorithm 
aversion. Human involvement only had an indirect effect via algorithm agency and capabil-
ities (Jussupow et al., 2020).
Human-Algorithm-Teaming
Algorithms rarely make decisions on their own; the topic of various forms and degrees 
of human-algorithm teaming has therefore received attention. Starke and Lünich (2020) 
showed that pure algorithmic decisions of the European Union would be perceived as ille-
gitimate, whereas hybrid decisions are perceived as equally legitimate as human-only deci-
sions. The authors did, however, not specify the nature of the human-algorithm teaming. 
There is some conceptual work on this topic. Madni and Madni (2018) provide a frame-
work that distinguishes the roles of humans and machines; frequent roles are the human 
as supervisor and the machine either in an active or passive monitoring role. Van der Waa 
et al. (2020) focus on moral decisions and distinguish between human moral decision- 
making, supported moral decision-making, co-active moral decision-making, and auton-
omous moral decision-making, in which the artificial moral agent makes moral decisions 
on its own. These conceptual papers give examples of the different configurations and dis-
cuss the advantages and disadvantages of the different patterns, but they do not examine 
which factors determine the preference for lower or higher algorithmic input. In the paper 
at hand, we fill this gap and use the COVID-19 pandemic as a setting to explore the role of 
situational and individual factors.
Situational Factors
Morality/Severity of the Decision
The first factor we considered was the moral dimension of the decision task. According 
to Schein and Gray (2018), the judgment of whether a situation is morally laden depends 
on whether there is harm involved and how severe the consequences are. Although 
there are representative surveys showing that people are less likely to accept algorithmic 
decision-making in situations with severe consequences for humans such as parole, med-
ical diagnoses and decisions, or personal finance scores (Grzymek & Puntschuh, 2019; 
Longoni et al., 2019; Smith, 2018), there is surprisingly little experimental research on this 
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topic. Bigman and Gray (2018) concluded that people display algorithm aversion when the 
algorithms make moral decisions such as deciding over parole, or medical decisions. This 
conclusion might imply a comparison with less moral-laden decisions; however, the nine 
studies reported in the paper all used moral decision-making situations. In a similar vein, 
Longoni et al. used only scenarios involving medical decision-making. 
In contrast, in one of the few papers that showed high algorithm acceptance across sev-
eral studies most decisions were objective judgment tasks (such as the weight of a person) 
or had mild consequences (i.e., suggesting a dating partner; Logg et al., 2019). Castelo et 
al. (2019) compared subjective and objective decision-making tasks and found that people 
preferred algorithms for objective tasks. These objective tasks are less moral-laden. Taken 
together, prior findings warrant the expectation that people are less algorithm averse if deci-
sions involve less morality. This was, however, not directly tested in any of the studies. 
Work on human-machine teaming has, to our knowledge, not systematically compared 
scenarios varying in morality, but it assumes that it will take some time until artificial moral 
agents reach human or even super-human levels of moral decision-making; consequen-
tially, human-machine teaming is needed (van der Waa et al., 2020). This work, thus, also 
implicitly assumes that people prefer less algorithmic involvement in moral decisions.
 To systematically explore the role of morality, the work at hand varies the severity and 
thus morality of the decision’s consequences across three scenarios: (1) a scenario about the 
distribution of ventilators among patients, (2) a scenario about financial support for busi-
nesses suffering economically from the COVID-19 pandemic, and (3) a scenario on curfew 
rules for members of risk groups. Since the ventilator scenario is about life and death, it 
was considered the most morality-laden scenario with the most severe consequences and 
should thus be met with the lowest preference for algorithms. We had no prediction about 
the order of the other two scenarios.
H1: Preference for algorithmic decision-making is lowest in the ventilator sce-
nario (highest morality and severity).
Perspective
We assumed that it matters whether a person is the target of a decision or the decision- 
maker. An alternative explanation for the algorithm appreciation found in the studies 
reported by Logg et al. (2019) is that the authors used the advice-taking paradigm; partic-
ipants had to make decisions and received advice stemming allegedly from an algorithm 
versus a human. In such a scenario, the algorithm might help the human make better deci-
sions. Decision-makers might thus activate an “advanced tool” or even a “teammate” men-
tal model (Matthews et al., 2020, p. 234) and be willing to share the responsibility for a 
decision with an algorithm. Targets of a decision, by contrast, might view the algorithm as 
a threat and be more interested in self-benefit than in the most accurate or efficiently made 
decision. Self-serving biases have been shown in the domain of preference of fairness rules 
(Messick & Sentis, 1983) and have been reported as “outcome favorability bias” in studies 
on algorithm acceptance (Wang et al., 2020, p. 1). In the context of COVID-19, elderly peo-
ple with several diseases might, for example, be afraid that the “objectively” best decision is 
to give the ventilator to a younger person with a higher chance of surviving a COVID-19 
infection. In their mental model, the algorithm might form a threat to their life. They might, 
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however, hope to be able to influence a human decision-maker, for example, by appealing 
to empathy or by bribery. Therefore, we expect a higher preference for algorithms among 
decision-makers relative to targets of decisions.
H2: Preference for algorithmic decision-making is higher in the decision-maker 
(versus target of decision) condition.
Next to these situational factors, there might be inter-individual differences that predict 
the preference for algorithmic versus human decision-making. 
Individual Factors
Conventionalism
Algorithms and artificial intelligence are quite new phenomena. To a layperson, it is often 
not clear how algorithms make complex decisions (Grzymek & Puntschuh, 2019). Grgic-
Hlaca et al. (2018) found that conservatism affected the perceived fairness of algorithms. 
Similarly, we expected that people scoring high on conventionalism, that is, people who 
prefer to stick to established procedures and norms, are more averse toward these new 
and non-transparent technologies and hence show a weaker preference for algorithmic 
decision-making.
H3: People higher in conventionalism show a weaker preference for algorithmic 
decision-making.
Need for Leadership
A personality factor that might be relevant in times of crisis is the need for leadership. 
Crises are characterized by uncertainties; this holds especially for the novel coronavirus. 
At the time this study was conducted, nobody knew when a treatment or a vaccine would 
be found and how large the impact of the lockdowns on the economy or mental health of 
people would be. In times of crisis, people show a stronger need for leadership (Mulder & 
Stemerding, 1963). People expect leaders to make clear and consistent decisions, as could 
be seen in the higher approval ratings of politicians who implemented tough measures in 
response to COVID-19 (Erlanger, 2020). Based on this assumption, one should expect that 
a higher need for leadership is related to a preference for human decision-making. How-
ever, it might also be the case that a higher need for leadership is related to a preference for 
algorithmic decision-making because algorithms might be perceived as more objective (in 
the sense of following the same rules all the time) and thus as giving clearer and more con-
sistent guidance. It is also possible that need for leadership is related to higher endorsement 
for decisions made by one entity alone (versus a team), no matter whether it is a human 
or an algorithm. Since there are several possibilities, an open research question was posed:
RQ: Is need for leadership related to algorithm preference?
Attitudes Toward Algorithms and Knowledge
By way of exploration, the participants’ attitudes toward algorithms and knowledge about 
algorithms were assessed. Concerning the attitudes, we covered the perceived decision 
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quality (ability of algorithms to process large amounts of data/a wider variety of data types), 
different aspects of fairness, and perceived manipulability to explore whether the effects of 
the other variables remain robust when controlling for attitudes and knowledge. The focus 
of the experiment is—as can also be seen in the preregistration—however, on the situa-
tional and individual factors. 
The hypotheses and research questions, operationalization, design, and analysis plan 
have been preregistered at https://aspredicted.org/zv2m2.pdf.1
Method
Participants
The study was approved by the local ethics committee of Leibniz-Institut für Wissensmedien 
(Knowledge Media Research Center), Tübingen. All 14,283 members of the WiSoPanel, an 
online access panel for non-commercial research (Göritz et al., 2021), were invited via email 
to participate. The experiment had a 3 (scenario: ventilator, financial support, curfew) × 2 
(perspective: target of the decision versus decision-maker) design. The scenario factor was a 
within-subjects factor; the perspective factor was manipulated between subjects. Only peo-
ple who permitted the use of their data at the end of the questionnaire (1,192 women, 968 
men) were retained. Most of the participants were German (96.6%), 1.9% were Austrian, 
1% Swiss, and 0.4% from other countries. The largest group of participants (31.7%) had a 
university degree, 23.8% A-Levels, 29.5% O-Levels, 11.4% had finished 9 years of school, 
0.6% had no degree (yet), and 3.1% had a doctorate. The majority (61.1%) were working, 
20.4% were retired, 8.1% pupils/students, 5.7% unemployed, and 1% on parental leave.
Procedure 
After reading the introduction and providing informed consent, respondents stated their 
preferences for algorithmic versus human decision-making in three COVID19-related 
decision scenarios. Depending on the experimental condition, participants either took the 
perspective of the target of the decision or of the decision-maker in all three scenarios. 
Independent Variables
Scenarios
In the first scenario, participants were asked to imagine that there were more COVID-19 
patients than ventilators, hence a decision about who gets a ventilator had to be made. 
In the second scenario, a decision about whether financial support should be granted to 
business owners who suffered financially from the COVID-19-induced closure of their 
business had to be made. In the last scenario, participants were told that the local public 
health departments would decide for individual members of risk groups whether they had 
to adhere to stronger curfew rules.
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Perspective
In the target of the decision condition, participants were asked to imagine that they were a 
COVID-19 patient, a business owner, or at higher risk to die from COVID-19, respectively 
for the three scenarios. In the decision-maker condition, participants were asked to imag-




Since hitherto used measures are not equally applicable to decision-makers and decision 
targets and because we aimed to go beyond a dichotomous choice between human ver-
sus algorithm, we offered six combinations of human-algorithm teaming (see Table 1, top 
row) and gave people fine-grained options to indicate their preferences. Participants were 
instructed to distribute 100 points across the decision-making options. They could either 
assign 100 points to their favorite option or split the points across options. For the first three 
options, the algorithm made the final decision; for the last three options, a human made 
the final decision. In the two most extreme cases, the decision was made by the algorithm/
human alone. In the next option, in difficult cases, a human/an algorithm made a sugges-
tion that could be incorporated by the algorithm/human; in the two options in the middle, 
the algorithm/human considered the suggestion of the human/algorithm in all decisions. 
TABLE 1 Mean Number of Points Given to the Six Decision Options Across Scenarios 





























Ventilator decision target 21.42 25.75 28.44 12.07 6.37 5.96
decision-maker 12.57 24.21 34.20 13.08 7.42 8.53
Financial decision target 12.24 19.36 32.12 16.57 11.35 8.37
Support decision-maker 11.10 19.55 32.92 16.99 10.06 9.38
Curfew decision target 16.34 19.44 29.10 14.79 9.89 10.44
decision-maker 14.38 22.26 29.76 15.08 9.20 9.32
Note: Sums not adding up exactly to 100 within some rows due to rounding.
Need for Leadership
We adapted five items from the interpersonal hierarchy expectation scale by Mast (2005) 
to the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., “If people work together on a task like the 
current corona crisis, it’s best if one person is taking over the lead.”). Respondents indicated 
their agreement with the statements on a scale ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = 
“strongly agree” (α = .80, M = 4.48, SD = 1.26).
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Conventionalism
Conventionalism was measured with the 3-item scale by Beierlein et al. (2014). Agreement 
to statements like “It is always best to do things the usual way” was provided on a 7-point 
Likert scale (α = .83, M = 3.65, SD = 1.56).
Attitude Toward Algorithms
To measure attitude toward algorithms, 10 items were developed that covered various 
aspects of decision-making. Participants indicated whether they thought humans or algo-
rithms would usually perform better on a certain aspect on a scale from 1 = “humans” to 
3 = “humans and algorithms to the same degree” to 5 = “algorithms.” A confirmatory factor 
analysis allowing for correlations between factors showed that, as expected, the 10 items 
loaded on five factors (χ2[25, N = 2147] = 218.20, p < .001; CFI = 0.94; RMSEA = .060), cor-
rectness of decision (M = 3.21, SD = 0.75), procedural fairness (e.g., judge situations always 
along the same factors, M = 3.98, SD = 0.92), multifactorial decision-making (M = 3.17, SD 
= 1.01), manipulability (M = 2.33, SD = 1.00), and general fairness (M = 3.13, SD = 0.87). 
For items and more results see https://osf.io/cx6z8/. 
Knowledge About Algorithms
As a control variable, participants were asked to indicate their knowledge about algorithms 
(definition, methods, accuracy, fairness) on a scale from 1 = very poor knowledge to 7 = 
very good knowledge (M = 4.08, SD = 1.53).
Manipulation Checks
Participants were asked whether they had been in the role of the patient or physician in 
Scenario 1, business owner or clerk in Scenario 2, a member of the group at higher risk of 
the coronavirus or employee at the public health department in Scenario 3. There was also a 
“don’t know” option to reduce guessing. Participants were also asked to rank order the three 
scenarios in terms of severity and moral dimension by dragging and dropping them to the 
top, middle, or bottom position. 
COVID-19-Related Additional Measures 
Participants were asked for their subjective risk to get infected with COVID-19, whether 
they were at higher risk from coronavirus according to the criteria issued by the national 
Robert Koch institute (e.g., smoking, chronic medical condition), whether they had been 
infected with COVID-19, or whether close others had been infected or died. The likeli-
hood of experiencing negative financial consequences due to the COVID-19 pandemic was 
assessed on a scale from 1 = “very unlikely” to 6 = “certainly.” Of the final sample (see below), 
only 10 had been infected with COVID-19, 5.6% reported one or more infected close oth-
ers. Roughly a quarter considered it likely, very likely, or certain to become infected, and 
44.7% were members of a risk group. 
Demographics 
The following demographics were retrieved from the panel data: year of birth, gender, coun-
try, education, and employment status. The intercorrelations between the central measures 
are displayed in Table 2.
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Data Preparation 
Missings. Two participants were excluded because they had more than 30% missing values.
Construction of the dependent measure. As preregistered, we first inspected the distribu-
tions. To assess nuanced preferences, participants had the option to split 100 points across 
six options rather than choosing only one option. The majority (56 to 60%, depending on 
the scenario) did not split but gave 100% to their favorite option. Most people who split 
their 100 points chose adjacent options (see Table 1 for descriptives). Therefore, we scored 
the options from 1 (human alone) to 6 (algorithm alone) and multiplied them with the 
points given, resulting in a scale from 100 to 600. Higher values represent a higher pref-
erence for algorithmic decision-making. A person giving 60 points to Option 3 (human 
decides, but always with input from the algorithm), and 40 points to Option 4 (algorithm 
decides, but always with input from the human), for example, has a score of 340 (3 * 60 + 4 * 
40 = 340). A person favoring Option 3 with 60 points but leaning toward Option 2 (human 
decides, input from algorithm only in difficult cases) with 40 points has a score of 260 (2 




As intended, the majority (91.7%) perceived the ventilator scenario as the decision involv-
ing most morality. It was also perceived as the most severe scenario by 87.3%. The other 
two scenarios did not differ as clearly from each other; the curfew scenario was perceived 
as the second-highest moral-laden (52%) and least severe (61.5%) scenario by most. The 
financial support scenario was perceived as involving the least morality (55.1%) and as the 
second-most severe scenario (58.8%). Since our hypothesis addressed the difference 
between the first and the other two scenarios, we considered the manipulation of the with-
in-subjects variable as successful. 
The manipulation check for perspective was answered correctly by 69.2% of the respon-
dents for Scenario 1, by 64.9% for Scenario 2, and by 68% for Scenario 3. Respondents 
more often gave a wrong answer (between 20% and 33%, depending on the scenario) than 
choosing the “don’t know” option. Interestingly, respondents in the decision-maker con-
dition recalled the condition they were in better than respondents in the target condition 
(75.3% vs. 63.3% in Scenario 1, 74.6% vs. 55.3% in Scenario 2, 72.8% vs. 63.3% in Scenario 
3, all χ²s > 22.13, p < .001). As preregistered, people who failed the manipulation check 
were excluded from the analysis; 1,127 participants were retained in the analysis (457 in the 
target condition, 670 in the decision-maker condition). 
Descriptive Results
Before turning to the effects of the situational and individual variables, we briefly report 
the descriptive results. Table 1 shows that respondents overall leaned toward human 
decision-making. A closer look reveals, however, that algorithmic input is welcome; spe-
cifically, algorithmic input in all situations is favored over algorithmic input in difficult 
Utz, Wolfers, and Göritz 37
situations only. This suggests that participants want a human to make the final decision, but 
this human should team up with the algorithm.
Effects of Scenario and Perspective
A 2 (perspective: decision target versus decision-maker) × 3 (Scenarios 1 to 3) repeated 
measures analysis of variance with repeated measures on the second factor and algorithm 
preference as dependent variable was conducted to test H1 and H2. In line with H1, there 
was a significant main effect of scenario, Huynh-Feldt corrected F(1.994, 2243.36) = 40.48, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .04. Preference for algorithms was lowest in the ventilator scenario (M = 
286.46, SE = 3.75, Bonferroni-corrected comparisons with both other scenarios p < .001). 
The curfew scenario (M = 311.18, SE = 4.13) and the financial support scenario (M = 
318.80, SE = 3.84) did not differ significantly, p = .11. In contrast to H2, the main effect of 
perspective was not significant, F < 1, p = .34. There was, however, an interaction between 
perspective and scenario, Huynh-Feldt corrected F(1.994, 2243.36) = 9.79, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.01. In the ventilator scenario, algorithm preference was higher in the decision-maker con-
dition (M = 299.02, SE = 4.77) than in the target condition (M = 273.90, SE = 5.78, p = .001). 
In the financial support scenario, the means were almost identical (M = 318.79, SE = 5.92 
in the target condition, M = 318.80, SE = 4.89 in the decision-maker condition, p = .999). 
In the curfew scenario, the mean in the target condition was somewhat higher (M = 314.34, 
SE = 6.37) than in the decision-maker condition (M = 308.03, SE = 5.26), but this difference 
was not significant, p = .444. H2 is thus partly supported, namely in the ventilator scenario.
Influence of Individual Characteristics
To examine the role of individual characteristics, we conducted a multilevel analysis, treat-
ing scenario as nested within participants.2 We included a random intercept for participants. 
In Step 1, we examined the effect of conventionalism (H3) and need for leadership (RQ) 
in addition to the effects of perspective, scenario, and the interaction effects. We controlled 
for being a member of a COVID-19 risk group and the risk to suffer from financial losses. 
In Step 2, we exploringly added the attitude subscales and knowledge about algorithms. 
Predictors were grand mean centered (see Enders & Tofighi, 2007). Standardized regression 
coefficients are reported as effect size measures in Table 3 (see Lorah, 2018). 
Table 3, Model 1, on the following page, shows the findings to be in line with H3: There 
was a negative relationship between conventionalism and algorithm preference. The answer 
to RQ1 is that need for leadership is positively related to a higher preference for algorithms. 
Exploratory Analyses
In Model 2, we explored how the attitude toward algorithms affected algorithm prefer-
ence. Several attitudes emerged as significant predictors: Algorithms were preferred more 
if they were evaluated as making more correct decisions, being fairer (in general and 
procedure-wise), and as integrating more aspects into their decision. Perceived knowledge 
about algorithms was significantly associated with preferring an algorithm, but effects were 
smaller than the effects of attitudes. Whereas the effects of scenario and the interaction with 
perspective still held, the effects of conventionalism and need for leadership were no longer 
significant when adding attitudes and knowledge to the model.
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TABLE 3 Multilevel Regression Analysis on Preference for Algorithmic Decision-Making
Fixed effects Random 
effects
Parameters Estimate SE t β SD
Model 1
Intercept 307.39 3.36 91.61 .01 93.91
P: Decision-maker cond. 7.48 6.87 1.09 .03
Sc: Ventilator cond. -22.19 3.87 -5.74* -.08
Sc: Financial support cond. 8.62 3.87 2.23* .03
Need for leadership 10.12 2.81 3.61* .10
Conventionalism -7.21 2.34 -3.07* -.08
Risk: health -11.87 6.78 -1.75 -.05
Risk: financial -0.01 2.29 -0.00 -.00
Perspective × Ventilator 29.39 7.89 3.72* .05
Perspective × Financial 6.45 7.89 0.82 .01
Model 2
Intercept 306.56 2.92 105.11 .00 77.73
P: Decision-maker cond. 8.94 5.97 1.50 .03
Sc: Ventilator cond. -22.19 3.87 -5.74* -.08
Sc: Financial support cond. 8.62 3.87 2.23* .03
Need for leadership 2.92 2.48 1.17 .02
Conventionalism -0.24 2.11 -0.12 -.00
Risk: health -5.65 5.92 -0.95 -.02
Risk: financial 2.67 2.00 1.33 .03
Perspective × Ventilator 29.39 7.89 3.72* .05
Perspective × Financial 6.45 7.89 0.82 .01
A: correctness 42.58 4.69 9.08* .24
A: procedural fairness 11.25 3.90 2.88* .07
A: multifactorial DM 10.37 3.07 3.38* .08
A: manipulability -3.44 3.20 -1.08 -.02
A: general fairness 23.31 3.97 5.87* .15




Note. 3,018 observations on 1,006 individuals. Higher values indicate a preference for an algorithm; P = 
Perspective; Sc = Scenario; A = Attitude; DM = decision-making; Predictors are grand mean centered; All 
factors were coded using contrast coding (Gelman & Hill, 2007). * |t| > 2.0, indicating a significant effect.
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Discussion
The goal of this work was to examine the preference for different forms of human-algorithm 
teaming in algorithmic decision-making, exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic to create 
three salient and realistic scenarios. We examined the effects of situational (morality, per-
spective) and individual characteristics (conventionalism, need for leadership). In addition, 
the roles of attitudes toward algorithms and knowledge were explored. We found that the 
morality of a decision mattered: Participants showed the lowest preference for algorithmic 
decision-making in the ventilator scenario. Moreover, in this scenario decision targets were 
more reluctant to let algorithms decide than decision-makers. Higher conventionalism was 
associated with a lower preference for algorithmic decision-making, whereas a higher need 
for leadership was associated with a higher preference for algorithmic decision-making. 
Attitudes toward algorithms and knowledge contributed to predicting algorithm prefer-
ence; thereby, decision quality and fairness were most important.
Contributions to Prior Work
Our results contribute to work on human-algorithm teaming by providing a measure that 
assesses the preference for certain combinations of human-algorithm teaming. Different 
patterns have been described before (Madni & Madni, 2018; van der Waa et al., 2020), and 
it has been shown that people favor hybrid decision-making over pure algorithmic deci-
sion-making (Starke & Lünich, 2020), but less was known about preferences for the dif-
ferent forms of human-algorithm teaming. We showed that participants overall preferred 
algorithmic advice in all decision situations to algorithmic advice only in difficult decision 
cases.
Prior work rarely looked at situational and individual characteristics that predict these 
preferences systematically. Another contribution of our work lies, thus, in varying the 
morality of the scenarios and the perspective of the participant. Work that merely looked at 
medical decision-making showed that algorithm preference is low in such scenarios (Big-
man & Gray, 2018; Longoni et al., 2019). Our results demonstrate that algorithm preference 
is lower in more moral-laden scenarios and that this effect is more pronounced when being 
the target of the decision. Decision-makers were less influenced by the morality of the sce-
nario. 
In contrast to our prediction, perspective mattered only in the most moral scenario. We 
did, thus, not find consistent evidence of an outcome favorability bias. Self-interest seems 
to bias decisions only in situations with high stakes. This seems to be in contrast with prior 
work, but in those studies, the outcomes were explicitly stated, and the dependent mea-
sure was perceived fairness, not the preference for algorithmic decision-making (Wang 
et al., 2020). Future research, however, is needed to explicitly test the role of self-interest 
and (expected) outcomes. The observation that perspective did not matter much also has 
implications for the interpretation of prior work. It suggests that the algorithm appreciation 
reported by Logg et al. (2019) may not be due to the decision-maker perspective but the 
moral-free judgment tasks.
40 Human-Machine Communication 
This study also contributes to work on individual predictors of algorithm preference; 
a topic that has been understudied compared to work on algorithm characteristics (Jus-
supow, 2020). We found the expected negative relationship between conventionalism and 
algorithm preference. With need for leadership, we found a positive association with algo-
rithm preference: People with a higher need for leadership are not necessarily more inter-
ested in a strong human leader, but in clear and consistent guidance, which might be more 
easily achieved by an algorithm in times of crisis. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
German federal states employed different rules regarding school openings or curfews, and 
this diversity in rules was evaluated negatively by most of the population (COSMO, 2021). 
Our exploratory analyses showed that attitudes toward algorithms mattered. Interest-
ingly, the preference for algorithmic decision-making was not influenced by the perceived 
manipulability, although humans were perceived as easier to manipulate, which could be 
a reason for decision targets to prefer humans. Instead, quality of decision-making and 
perceived general fairness mattered most. Our participants considered algorithms as fairer 
than humans; nevertheless, one should be aware that algorithmic decisions mirror existing 
human biases such as prejudice or stereotypes and thus discriminate against certain groups 
(Noble, 2018; Zafar et al., 2019). The quality of algorithms depends on the training data 
used; if, for example, historic hiring data of a company that predominantly hired men are 
used to train an algorithm, the algorithm is likely to discriminate against women (O’Neil, 
2016). Furthermore, deeper knowledge about algorithms was positively related to algorithm 
preference. Interestingly, knowledge was almost unrelated to attitudes but negatively associ-
ated with conventionalism. This shows again that conventionalism should be considered a 
potential barrier when trying to increase the public’s algorithm acceptance. 
After controlling for attitudes and knowledge, the effects of need for leadership and 
conventionalism were no longer significant, although the effects of scenario and perspec-
tive remained. The former is, however, not surprising because high attitude-behavior inten-
tion relationships are found when the correspondence between the attitude items and the 
behavior is high (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). It is often assumed that attitudes are informed by 
knowledge; our data indicate that personality matters as well. Especially conventionalism 
showed negative associations with knowledge and attitudes. The results thus hint at a poten-
tial underlying process: People higher in conventionalism might show a lower algorithm 
preference because they are less willing to learn about algorithms (and other new things) 
and have more negative attitudes.
Directions for Future Research
Our experiment provides a starting point for future research. First, future research should 
look at underlying processes. When it comes to the decision targets, assumed outcome 
favorability and self-interest (versus interest in the fairest decision) should be assessed. In 
the decision-makers, looking at the mental models could be fruitful. Do decision-makers 
perceive the algorithm as an advanced tool, a teammate (Matthews et al., 2020), or do they 
even develop new mental models for human-algorithm teaming (Gambino et al., 2020)? 
Second, work on human-algorithm teaming might focus more on the role of person-
ality. The body of work has hitherto mainly looked at characteristics of the algorithmic 
teammate (e.g., agency, perceived autonomy, transparency), but the preference for a certain 
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teaming-constellation might interact with individual characteristics. Considering both fac-
tors jointly would advance work on human-algorithm and more general human-machine 
teaming.
Third, future research could explore whether the results are specific to scenarios with a 
high salience and relevance like the COVID-19-related decisions we used during the pan-
demic. 
Fourth, cross-cultural research could explore how far attitudes and the relationships 
between attitudes and knowledge are due to the specific media coverage of algorithmic 
decision-making in certain countries.
Practical Implications
The results have practical implications for policymaking. They show that the public is, in 
general, open to advice from algorithms, but that people prefer a human making the final 
decision. Since algorithms rarely make decisions completely on their own, governments 
planning to use algorithmic decision-making should use those only as advice-givers and 
communicate clearly that a human will make the final judgment. 
Campaigns for increasing algorithm acceptance should especially target conventional 
people and consider that this group overall knows less about algorithms. For less moral 
decisions, it is important to know that decision-makers and targets did not differ in their 
preference of human-algorithm teaming and can thus be targeted with the same campaign. 
When it comes to moral decisions—as they occur frequently during a life-threatening 
pandemic—it is important to especially address the potential targets of the decisions 
because this group shows a lower preference for algorithmic input than decision-makers.
Limitations and Strengths
A limitation of the study is the relatively high number of failed manipulation checks. We, 
however, still had more than 1,100 people for analysis and thus almost twice the preregis-
tered sample size of n = 602 for 80% power. Another limitation is that we did not randomize 
the order of the scenarios. Some may consider it a limitation that the scenarios varied in 
the domain (e.g., health versus finance). However, this confound cannot be avoided because 
decisions threatening a person’s life are inherently more moral than decisions involving 
finance because they imply more harm (Schein & Gray, 2018). The same situation has been 
faced by other authors; Reniers et al. (2012), for example, used robbing a bank to pay the 
cancer medicine for one’s wife versus eating chips while one should lose weight as a moral 
versus non-moral decision. 
Furthermore, it is important to interpret our results considering the situation in Ger-
many. Germany did a relatively good job in dealing with the pandemic at the time of data 
collection. It is thus unclear to which extent the results can be generalized to countries with 
an actual shortage of ventilators and a less tight-meshed social support system. The effects 
might be stronger in a country more strongly affected by COVID-19. Likewise, mean levels 
of need for leadership, conventionalism, and attitudes toward algorithms are likely to differ 
among countries; especially because issues such as racial discrimination by algorithms are 
less salient in Germany than, for example, the US (Noble, 2018).
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A strength of our study is the large and heterogeneous sample, covering a wide range 
of age, education levels, and employment status. Moreover, the decision-making scenarios 
were more realistic and salient than some of the advice-taking paradigms used in prior 
research on algorithm aversion. 
To conclude, this study showed that the morality of a decision is a situational factor 
that determines the preference for different forms of algorithm-human teaming. The per-
spective decision target versus decision-maker mattered only in the most moral scenario. 
Moreover, personality factors such as need for leadership and conventionalism should be 
considered when studying attitudes toward algorithms and algorithm preference.
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Footnotes
1. We had two additional hypotheses and a research question on the role of individual 
outcome expectations. We realized, however, that we had not completely thought 
these through and not operationalized this variable in the best possible way. Based on 
reviewer feedback on a prior version on this manuscript, we decided to not include the 
weak theoretical justification and the results of these analyses. We adjusted the num-
bering of the hypotheses and research question. These analyses are, however, available 
on https://osf.io/cx6z8/. We also provide a table listing and justifying deviations from 
the preregistration on OSF.
2. In the preregistration, we had planned to do separate regression analyses per sce-
nario. The main reason for this procedure was that the individual outcome expecta-
tions (see Footnote 1) were operationalized in different ways across the scenarios. Since 
we dropped this variable, we opted for the more appropriate multilevel approach that 
allows us to control for the nested data structure (scenarios nested within participants) 
and presents the results in a more compact way. The basic pattern is identical.

